Companies must act quickly when facing disruption

Julien Brun, managing partner, CEL

There is a recognisable pattern in how supply chains respond to geopolitical shocks. The event occurs, costs rise, and companies stockpile, renegotiate, and wait. When pressure eases, operations return to prior defaults. The structural vulnerabilities remain untouched, while the next shock finds the same gaps.

After military strikes on Iran disrupted the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 25 per cent of seaborne oil normally flows, early evidence suggests that pattern is repeating in Vietnam. CEL’s pulse survey of 105 Vietnam-based supply chain professionals (March 30 to April 10) found 87 per cent reporting disruption, but only 13 per cent describing it as significant.

The more telling number is that 67 per cent described their readiness as “neutral”, uncertain whether they are managing well. More than half expect disruption to last six months or longer.

Vietnam’s policy machinery has moved quickly. The fuel price stabilisation fund was tapped at VND4,000-5,000 (15-19 US cents) per litre on March 11, capping the RON95 hike at 7.66 per cent against a projected 22.45 per cent. Most favoured nation fuel import tariffs were cut to zero through April 30. The April 4 government briefing confirmed domestic fuel supply is secured only through end-April, prompting prime minister-level outreach to the UAE, Qatar, and Algeria.

When comparing the region, Thailand’s state oil fund slipped 12 billion baht ($374.5 million) into deficit; Malaysia’s subsidy bill went from 700 million ($176.9 million) to 3.2 billion ringgit ($808.6 million) in a single week. Q1 registered foreign direct investment still rose 42.9 per cent on-year, but policy buffers operate at the country level. The bill is being paid sector by sector.

The most counterintuitive finding from the survey: only 20 per cent of respondents reported high direct exposure to Middle East-linked inputs, yet 87 per cent experienced disruption. The transmission channel is not supply; it is movement. When Hormuz faces severe disruption, container capacity tightens across the global fleet, fuel surcharges accumulate, and delays compound at transshipment hubs. The effects reach every trade lane regardless of geography.

Where it shows up in the numbers, Q1 textile exports grew 1.9 per cent and footwear 0.9 per cent, against electronics at 45.5 per cent. Cape rerouting adds 14-20 days to EU and US deliveries; US East Coast war-risk surcharges run $2,000-4,000 per container; and production costs are up 3-5 per cent while buyers refuse to absorb increases.

Elsewhere, Vinatex’s Q1 garment profit hit only 26 per cent of full-year target. The electronics surge largely reflects frontloaded orders; Q2 will look different. Upstream, Qatar supplies a third of global helium and spot prices have already spiked 40 per cent.

In agriculture, Simexco DakLak reports war-risk insurance up $2,000 per container, and Vina T&T Group has shifted to fully refrigerated containers with loss-sharing renegotiated with buyers. In recent terms, Vinachem signed an apatite ore MoU with Egypt’s Kayan on April 14.

Companies are stockpiling, adjusting volumes, and renegotiating contracts, and these are rational short-term moves. What is largely absent is structural response: diversifying carrier relationships, stress-testing routing, mapping supplier exposure beyond tier one, and building contract optionality before the next disruption begins.

There is a specific phase between early disruption and either stabilisation or full emergency. Costs are rising, but are not yet critical; routes are stressed but not severed. Urgency is sufficient to justify decisions, but emergency has not yet foreclosed deliberate planning. That window is open in Vietnam now, and it closes one of two ways: conditions ease and urgency fades, or conditions deteriorate and emergency mode takes over. Neither supports redesign.

Firstly, reprice contracts on a 90-day cycle. War-risk surcharges and bunker volatility need a contractual mechanism, not a quarterly renegotiation crisis.

Secondly, build cost-pass-through, force majeure, and cost-sharing clauses into every new shipping contract, as the Ministry of Industry and Trade explicitly recommends.

Thirdly, run scenarios at three Brent prices ($80, $100, and $120) for the next six months. Agro and textiles need an inventory and working-capital plan; electronics needs an input-stockpile plan.

Fourthly, map the actual single points of failure in the network: one feedstock, one route, one buyer concentration. Diversify against those first.

The next disruption will not ask whether companies understood the risk – it will ask whether they acted when they still had the choice.

Sources: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook April 2026 • IMF/FRED (POILBREUSDM) • ElA Today In Energy • Trading Economics